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Summary  findings
Remarkably  diverse  indicators  show quality  of life  across  With a seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (SUR)
nations  to be positively  associated  w;ith  per capita  estimator  in levels,  per capita income has an impact  on
income.  But changes  in quality  of life as income  grows  the quality  of life that  is significant,  positive,  and  more
are surprisingly  uneveni. Moreover,  in either  level  or  important  than  exogenous  shifts  for 32  of 81 indicators.
changes,  the effect  of  exogenous  shifts  over  time is  With  a fixed  effects estimator,  growth  has an impact
surprisingly  strong.  on the  quality  of life that  is significant,  positive,  and
It is possible  that  changes  in a home  country's  quality-  more  important  than  exogenous  shifts for  6 of 69
of-life  indicators  depend  as nuch  on changes  in world  quality-of-life  indicators.
income  as on changes  in home  country  growth.  The  The  evidence  that  life gets betrer during growth  is
improvement  in hife expectancy  everywhere.  for  surprisingly  uneven.  The  cross-country  relationship
example,  may  have reflected  technical  breakthroughs  in  between  income  and  diverse  indicators  of the  quality  of
antibiotics  associated  with world  economic  growth.  The  life remains  strong.
strong  results  on exocenous  time  shlifts point  in this  Easterly  speculates  about  explanations  for  the pattern
direction.  of results,  such  as the  long and  variable  lags that  may
Easterly  reaches  this conclusion  using a panel  data  set  come  between  growth  and  changes  in the  quality  of life,
of  81 indicators  covering  up to four  periods  (1960,  and  the possibility  that  global  socioeconomic  progress  is
1970,  1980,  and  1990).  The  indicators  cover  seven  more  important  than  home  country  growth  for  many
subjects:  health,  education,  individual  rights  and  quality-of-life  indicators.
democracy,  political  instability  and war,  transport  and
communications,  inequality  across  class and gender,  and
"bads."
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I. Introduction
Does life during  growth  get better? Scholars  differ.
Scholars  in the new  growth  literature  have  generally  found  the answer  to be yes. Barro
[1996, 1997]  finds  quality of life  indicators  like civil liberties  and democracy  to be positive
functions  of per capita income  across  countries.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin  1995 likewise  find per
capita  income  positively  associated  with two measures  of health:  infint mortality  and life
expectancy. 1 Barro and Lee 1997  find  that per capita  income  is significant  in a regression  for the
schooling  outcomes  of test scores,  repetition,  and dropout  rates.  Pritchett  and Sumners 1995  find
that "wealthier  is healthier,"  i.e.  that higher  income  causally  lowers  infant  mortality.  Grossman  and
Krueger  1993  find that higher  income  eventually  lowers  pollution.  Boone  1996 shows  that
political,  gender,  and ethnic  oppression  decline  as one goes from  poorer  to richer  countries.  Mauro
1993  finds  a strong relationship  between  per capita income  and an average  of indices  of red tape,
inefficient  judiciary, and corruption.  Clague,  Keefer,  Knack,  and Olson  1996  likewise  establish  a
relationship  between  high  per capita  income  and high  quality  institutions  -- freedom  from
expropriation,  freedom  from contract  repudiation,  freedom  from  corruption,  and rule of law.
Keefer  and Knack 1997  find a strong  association  between  per capita  income  and trust between
individuals  in a society.
All of this literature  has featured  cross-national  associations.  However,  if there are country
fixed  factors,  then these fixed  factors  may drive  a spurious  correlation  between  income  and the
"life" indicator.  There  is no shortage  of fixed  factors in the new growth  literature.  Hall and Jones
(1997, 1998)  suggest  distance  from  the equator  and use of a European  language  as instruments  for
"social  infrastructure"  measured  by openness  and institutions,  which  in turn is an explanatory
variable  for productivity.  Sachs  and Warner [1995, 1997]  have  suggested  a country's  access  to the
sea, natural resource  abundance,  and tropical  location  as fixed,  explanatory  variables  for income.
Easterly  and Levine 1997  point  to ethnolinguistic  fragmentation  as a fixed  factor holding  back3
Africa's economy.  Another  quasi-fixed  factor  could  be the legal system  (see Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer,  and Vishny 1997).  These  fixed  factors  may  also affect  the "life"  indicators  -- for
example,  Filmer  and Pritchett  1997  found  that ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  increased  infant
mortality.
The recent growth  literature  did not of course  start the study  of life  during  growth.  Early
development  economists  were  optimistic  about how  growth  would improve  a wide range  of health
and education  indicators.  Political  scientists  went even  further  to include  political  development
(democracy  and much more)  as a correlate  of economic  development.  Huntington  1968 (p. 32)
saw a process  of "modernization"  that was "a multifaceted  process  involving  changes  in all areas
of human  thought  and activity."  The assumption,  as Huntington  recalled  later,  was that "all good
things  go together." 2
The second  generation  of development  economists  and political  scientists  fiercely
challenged  these conclusions.  One  prominent  social scientist  proclaimed  "modernization:  RIP." 3
According  to the leading  development  textbook  of Todaro 1997:
The experience  of the 1950s  and 1960s,  when  a large  number  of Third  World
nations  did achieve  the overall  UN growth  targets but the levels  of living  of the
masses  of people  remained  for the most part unchanged,  signaled  that something
was very wrong  with this narrow  definition  of development  {per capita  GNP}.
These  sentiments  have  made  their way into commentaries  on development  by many  international
organizations  and commissions. 4 The usual concern,  as expressed  above,  is that income
distribution  worsens  during growth  sufficiently  that the poor majority  experience  no rise in income.
The  dissatisfaction  with GDP as an indicator  of well-being  led Morris  (1979)  to propose  an
alternative  indicator  to GDP called  the Physical  Quality  of Life  Index (PQLI). The PQLI was an
unweighted  index  of literacy,  infant  mortality,  and life expectancy. Morris' proposal  was widely
adopted  (the  United  Nations Development  Program  now uses a modified  version  called  the Human
Development  Indicator).4
However,  development  economists  looking  at cross-section  data about  income  per capita
and the quality of life in developing  countries  found  evidence  more  in line with the earlier
optimism.  Studies such as Wheeler  1980,  Ram 1985,  Dasgupta  and Weale 1992,  Dasgupta 1993,
Kakwani  1993, Sen 1994,  and Klitgaard  and Fedderke  1998  generally  found  quality  of life
indicators  to be higher  in richer  nations.  But again  these  authors  usually  estimated  the relationship
across  nations.
The economic  history  literature  contains  virtually  the only  studies  looking  at life during
growth  across time rather  than across  countries. It finds surprisingly  mixed  changes  in quality  of
life as per capita income  increased.  While  many  standard  indicators  like  school  enrollment  and
infant  mortality  improved  steadily  with rising income,  there are contrarian  episodes  for other
indicators.  For example,  US life  expectancy  declined  from  about 1790  to about 1840,  a time of
robust per capita  growth.  Nutrition  also advanced  unevenly,  as American  nutrition  (as measured  by
stature)  deteriorated  from about 1830  to 1880  despite  rising  income  (Fogel 1990).  Conversely,  life
expectancy  rose by 4 years during  the Great  Depression  of the 1930s  (Fogel 1994).  More
subjectively,  there is the "Easterlin  paradox"  that surveys  of self-reported  happiness  do not show
increasing  happiness  as per capita  income  rises over  time within  a given  country  (Easterlin  1996).
A debate  about contrarian  trends in living  conditions  during  English  industrialization  dates
back  to Engels' denunciation  of the "dark Satanic  mills"  as "social  murder."  Pessimists  like
Thompson  (1975)  believe  that urban quality  of life got worse  from the late 18th  to the mid 19th
centuries.  Optimists  like Lindert  and Williamson  1983  concede  that English  real wages  were
stagnant  during  early industrialization  from 1755  to 1810,  but they show  that real wages  doubled
frora 1810  to 1851. Infant  mortality  also declined  everywhere  in England  from 1841  to 1906
(Williamson  1982).  On  the other  hand,  crime, social  unrest, and illegitimacy  were apparently  rising
during  British  industrialization  (Lindert  and Williamson  1983). Polak and Williamson  19915
document  how  capital stock per capita  in public  works fell by 6 percent  from 1760  to 1830,  while
nonresidential  private capital was rising  by 29 percent.
The  economic  history literature  has also documented  long  lags between  rising per capita
income  and inproved quality of life. Morris 1995  studied  three  episodes  of rapid capitalist
development  and concluded  that four to five  decades  passed  before  the majority  of the population
got "delivery  of the goods."  Fogel 1994  believes  that the gain in nutrition  in OECD  countries
between  1910  and 1980  "was due to a series  of investments  made  as much  as a century  earlier."
Authors  in the "growth,"  "development,"  and "history"  literatures  have  designed  their
quality  of life studies well  to answer  many  important  questions.  But the question  of this paper  -
does  life during  growth  get better?  -- still  needs further  examination.  First, the previous  literature
has concentrated  only on a small range  of indicators  (with  the important  exception  of Fedderke  and
Klitgaard  1998).  Second,  the cross-section  studies  usually  focus on the partial  relationship  between
per capita  income  and any given  individual  indicator,  holding  other  factors  constant.  This is
perfectly  appropriate  for many  purposes,  but it does  not address  the question  of this paper when
virtually  all other factors are  themselves  plausibly  endogenous  to income.  Finally,  as already noted,
the literature  on recent data (with  some  exceptions)  has emphasized  only  cross-section  associations
between  quality  of life indicators  and per capita income. 5 The  possibility  of country  fixed  factors
suggests  that econometric  methods  that control  for fixed  factors  -- fixed  effects  and first differences
- should  also be applied,  even  though  the information  from the cross-section  results  remains  of
interest.
II. Data collection  and methodology
This section  describes  how I selected  and organized  the data series.
1. Description  of data collection  and organization
I used two criteria  to select  indicators.  The first criterion  was that indicators  should
unanbiguously  affect the quality  of life.  The majority  of readers  should  agree  on which  direction  of6
change  in the indicator  is "good."  The second  criterion  was that each  indicator  should  have  some
public  good aspect. Even  the worst  doubters  about growth  accept  that a private individual  will
purchase  more  private  goods  as his/her  income  rises;  the effect  of rising  income  on publicly
provided  goods  is less clear. While  private  goods  will  have  their  own  effect on quality  of life, I
focus  on the collective  quality  of life.  Data sources  are listed  in Appendix  1.6
Data span the years 1960,  1970, 1980,  and 1990. For data series  that were available  only
at irregularly  spaced  intervals,  I used  the average  of any data available  in the decade  subsequent  to
the initial  decade  year. Data that were available  at a single  point in the decade  other  than the
decade  year I assigned  to the closest  decade  year (Appendix  1 lists these  cases). The income  per
capita data, from Sunmmers  and Heston 1993 (version  5.6), is always for the beginning  of the
decade.  The final data set includes  86 indicators  of the quality  of life in seven  areas: (1) individual
rights and democracy,  (2) political  instability  and war, (3) education,  (4) health, (5) transport  and
communications,  (6) inequality  across  class and gender,  and (7) "bads.".
2. Methodology
I thus have a panel  data set for each indicator  of quality  of life  and income. Allowing  for
fixed  time and country  effects,  I have:
(1) I,t  = Xt  + gi + yit + sit
where  i indexes  countries  and t indexes  time (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990  -- but note  that one of the
time period  effects  has to be omitted).  yi,  is the log of per capita  income.  The quality  of life
indicator  Li,  I will allow  to be either  log or linear  in this and the following  equation,  depending  on
which  gives a better statistical  fit (determined  on the basis of the absolute  value of the t-statistic)
with respect  to yjt.  Also if an increase  in the indicator  I am using  means  worse quality  of life,  then I
take the negative  of the variable  (or of its log). Hence,  a positive  ,B  always means  that higher
income  imnproves  quality of life. I am  testing a simple  HI -- on average  a given  indicator  of quality7
of life gets better during growth,  or on average  it gets worse  - against  the  Ho  of zero change  (P=0).
I will later investigate  the possibility  of nonlinearities  in the relationship.
I will use three estimation  methods  to estimate  (1). First, I assume  a common  country
intercept (all  .tj = pt)  and estimate (1) using the method of seemingly  unrelated regressions (SUR)
across  decades.  This method  uses  both the cross-section  and time  series  variation  to make
inferences  about P. Second,  I estimate  (1) directly  by the method  of fixed  effects.  This method
removes  all cross-section  variation  and leaves  only  the time variation  (as differenced  from the
global  time shifts represented  by the k).7 Neither  SUR nor fixed  effects  address  the problem  of
possible  reverse  causality  from quality  of life  to income.  Indeed  many  of the indicators  used  here
have  been  used as determinants  of income  growth  in the growth  regression  literature  (e.g. education
and infrastructure).  To address  causality,  I use a third method.
The third method  is to take first differences  of (1)  to get:
(2)  Lit - Li,l  =  ?  - ?q,  +  P(yi-  yit-,) +  sit-sit.l
Formulation (2), which also removes the country fixed effect, has advantages and disadvantages
compared to the fixed effects formulation (1). (However, note that these two methods are
numerically equivalent when there are only two time periods.) The most important advantage of
(2) is that it makes possible to correct for the possible endogeneity  of y in (1). Instruments for y
that are exogenous and excludable from an L equation are hard to come by, but the lagged value of
y is always one popular candidate. As is well known, the lagged value of y is invalid as an
instrument in (1) because it is correlated with the error term. This is not a problem in (2) if Yit2  is
used as the instrument (Griliches and Hausman 1986, p. 102). The appropriately lagged growth
rate of y could also be used, but the literature has found the appropriately lagged level of y to
outperform the growth rate (Baltagi 1995, p. 126). The empirical growth literature has found a
number of policy determinants of growth, which are also available for use as instruments in (2).  I8
am going  to use three familiar  variables  from the empirical  growth  literature  - the black market
premium,  financial  depth,  and inflation.!  Note that the  first-stage  regression  is much  like  the cross-
country  regressions  usually  run in the growth  literature,  which  feature initial income  and policies
(cf. Barro and Sala-I-Martin  1995).
The disadvantage  of first differences  is that the properties  of the fixed  effects  estimator  are
better if y is exogenous  and the error  term is stationary  (Griliches  and Hausman 1986). The first
differences  IV estimator  may also have low  power  if the instruments  for growth  are less  than ideal.
Hence,  I will show  both sets of estimates  keeping  in mind  that the different  estimators  will  be
appropriate  under  different  circumstances  and assumptions.
Note that all estimation  methods  give  estimates  of the shift over  time in the intercept  X4.  I
willi  calculate  this as annualized  "exogenous  change". If Li,  is in logs and we have  data from 1960
to 1990,  then  the "exogenous  change"  is simply  (XQ  -X4  3 )/30. Using  the coefficient  on log per
capita income  from each regression  and the world average  log growth  rate of .0195,  1 calculate  an
analogous  annualized  "growth  effect" .0195  *¶.  When  L is linear,  then I will  divide  the change  by
the mean  in the initial  period.
III. Results of SUR method in levels
Table 1 shows  that 61 out of the 81 indicators  display  significant  and positive  effects  of
income  on  the quality  of life in levels,  often  with positive  double-digit  t-statistics  (remember  that I
take the minus of any variable  where an increase  indicates  worse  quality  of life).
Rich  countries  compared  to poor countries  have  more  democracy,  less corruption,  less
expropriation  of property,  more  contract-keeping  by governments,  more  rule of law, and higher
bureaucratic  quality.  Rich countries  compared  to poor countries  have  more civil liberties,  less
abuse of human  rights, less use of child  labor, more  political  rights,  and more  independence  of
politics  from the military.  Rich countries  compared  to poor countries  have fewer coups,  cabinet9
changes,  and revolutions,  less likelihood  of civil or international  war and less war deaths  per
capita,  less racial tension,  and less separatism.  9Rich  countries  compared  to poor countries  have
more  museums,  more  average  years of schooling,  higher  schooling  enrollment  ratios at all levels,
less illiteracy,  less people  with no schooling,  and more  book  titles published  per capita.  Rich
countries  compared  to poor countries  have  greater  life expectancy,  fewer  babies dying,  less
children  under 5 dying, more  calorie  and protein  intake,  more  doctors,  hospital  beds, and nurses.
Rich  countries  compared  to poor countries  have more  roads  paved,  more  telegrams,  telexes,
telephones,  fax machines,  radios,  and TVs, fewer  households  without  a toilet or clean drinking
water  (including  both rural and urban). Rich  countries  compared  to poor countries  have  less
inequality  between  rich  and poor,  a smaller  gap between  men  and women's literacy,  a smaller  gap
between  male and female  enrollment  ratios at all levels.  Rich countries  compared  to poor countries
have  less destruction  of forest area, and less smoke  in the air. The diversity  of indicators  shown
here  to be positively  associated  with  per capita  income  is greater  than in any previous study.
On the negative  side,  the "bads",  true to their  name,  show a negative  effect of income  on
the quality  of life in eleven  indicators.  Some  indicators  of pollution,  some  crimes,  injuries  in the
workplace,  and suicides  get  worse  with higher  income. 10 Also  road length  per car (an indicator  of
congestion  of the road network)  decreases  with per capita income.  So 12 of 81 indicators  indicate
worsening  quality  of life with higher  income.  Only 8 of the 81 indicators  of quality of life fail  to
show  a significant  relationship  with  income,  either  positive  or negative.  These  results indicate  very
strong  relationships  between  income  and quality  of life,  which  may  either reflect  a long run causal
relationship  between  income  and quality  of life, some  reverse  causality  from quality of life to
income,  or omitted  fixed  factors  determining  both income  and life.
Although  the income  effects  are strong, so is the exogenous  time  trend in many  of the
quality  of life indicators.  Of the 61 quality  of life indicators  that show significant  improvement
with  growth,  only 32 of them  show a growth  effect (at world  mean  growth)  that is greater  than the10
exogenous  improvement  over time. Of the 12 indicators  that showed  a significant  deterioration
with higher  income,  11 of them  have a positive  exogenous  improvement  that partially  offsets  the
negative  effects  of higher  income.  These  findings  suggest  that the previous  literature,  by focusing
on cross-section  samples,  overlooked  the important  role  of exogenous  global improvements  in
quality  of life indicators  regardless  of country  incomes.
IV. Results controlling  for country  effects
Controlling  for country  effects  has advantages  and disadvantages.  On one hand, it
removes  any spurious  correlation  between  income  and quality of life that a third  omitted  factor  may
have  caused.  On the other  hand, sweeping  out all the cross-section  variation  reduces  the range  of
variation  of income  and of the social  indicators.  Given  that there  is likely  to be noise  from
measurement  error, this makes  it harder  to detect  income  effects  on social indicators.  If the effects
of income  on quality  of life occur  with a long and variable  lag, the results will  be strong  in levels
but weak  controlling  for country  effects.  I will argue  that both the SUR levels  results  and the
results controlling  for country  effects  should  be taken  seriously  for a full  picture of how  the quality
of life evolves  during  growth.
I organize  the results controlling  for country  effects  by topic; each  topic will  have  one
section  in Table 2 and sometimes  a graph. The sections  show  the statistics  for each indicator  and
for each  estimation  method. The  patterns  to look for are simply  whether  the relationship  between
income  and the quality  of life  indicator  is significantly  positive. At the end  of this section,  I will do
an overview  of the patterns of significance  of indicators.
1. Individual  rights and democracy
Controlling  for country  effects,  income  coefficients  for two democracy  and rights
indicators  are significant  and positive  in both the fixed  effects  and first differences-IV  regressions:
child labor  and government  contract-keeping  (Table 2). (Recall  that I have changed  signs  so that an
increase  in the variable  always reflects  improved  quality  of life.) One  of the institutional  quality11
variables  - freedom  from corruption  - have a significant  and negative  relationship  with income  in
both the fixed  effects  and first differences-IV  results.  The correlations  between  income  and civil
liberties,  political  rights, and hurman  rights do not show  up here as significant  when  the country
fixed  effects  are removed.
Figure la shows  the significant  relationship  in a scatter of the Humana  human  rights index
in levels  against  income.  Figure lb shows  the non-relationship  in deviations  from time and country
averages.  I will  use here  and in the following  indicators  a smoothing  device  to visually  inspect  the
data. I order the sample  for indicator  L by income.  I calculate  the average  of indicator  L for the
poorest 30 observations  and the average  of income  for that same  group, and plot that point  on a
scatter  diagram  of indicator  L against  income.  Then  I move  one observation  and plot the average  of
the group of observations  2 to 31 ordered  by income.  I keep  doing  this to get a continuous  stream
of points until  I get to the top 30 observations.  Figure lc shows  the smoothed  data. Figures lb and
Id show  the unsmoothed  and smoothed  deviations  from  time and country  averages.  This smoothing
device  is simply  a moving  average  of 30 observations  ordered  by income  rather than by time. It
closely  resembles  what the nonparametric  literature  calls a "k-nearest  neighbor  estimator"  of the
typical  y for a given  x (see, for example,  p. 42ff, Hardle 1990).) 1 The dotted  lines  show  the 2-
standard  deviation  ranges  for the means.  I choose  the scale  of the vertical  axis of each  graph to
show the conceivable  maximum  and minimum  that the dependent  variable  could  reach,
unconditioned  by income,  in groups  of 30 observations.' 2 This helps us see how  much  y spans  the
range  of variation  of L.  If the countries  with the best (worst)  y are also the countries  with the best
(worst)  L, then  the heavy  black  line will  hit the corners  of the box in each graph. Figure lc shows
the strong  relationship  in the smoothed  data in levels.  Figure Id shows  the lack of relationship  in
smoothed  data in deviations.
2. Political  instability  and war12
None  of the political  instability  or war measures  are significant  in both  the fixed  effects
and first differences-IV  regressions  (Table 2). In the fixed  effect  regressions,  coups,  revolutions,
and war deaths  significantly  improve  with income.' 3 Absentees  from a significant  relationship  with
income  in fixed  effects  include  racial  tensions  and prevalence  of separatist  movements,  which  were
strongly  related  to income  in levels  (see Table 1). Figure  2b with smoothed  data shows,  for
example,  how  little evidence  there is for a relationship  over time between  income  and freedom  from
racial tensions  after removing  country  effects,  while  figure  2a shows  the strong  levels  relationship.
3. Education
The relationship  of education  to income  across  countries  has been  firmly  established  in the
cross-section  literature  (as well as here in Table 1). However,  none of the education  variables  are
positively  and significantly  related  to income  in both the fixed  effects  and first differences  - IV
regressions(Table  2). Primary  enrollment  is actually  negatively  and significantly  related  to income
using  both methods.  (Pritchett  (1997)  shows  a similar  negative  correlation  in first differences  for
enrollment  ratios  and income,  although  he is looking  at income  growth  as the dependent  variable).
The pcsitive  effects  of income  on average  schooling  years for the population,  college  enrollment,
and secondary  enrollment  do hold up under fixed  effects.
Figures  3a and 3b illustrate  again how  different  are the cross-section  and the cross-time
results, in this case for literacy. Figure 3a shows  the indisputable  relationship  between  income  and
literacy  in the pooled  cross-section,  cross-time  sample.  Figure 3b shows  the lack of relationship  in
first differences.  Recall  that the range of values  along  the vertical  axis represents  the  maximum  and
minimum  of the dependent  variable.  Figure 3b shows  how  none of this variation  is explained,  in
contrast  to the levels  chart where  almost  all the variation  is explained.  To anticipate  results  on
exogenous  changes  in social  indicators,  figure  3b also shows  that the growth  in literacy  was
positive  regardless  of the growth  rate of income.
4. Health13
There  are widely  known  relationships  across countries  between  income  and health
indicators  such as infant  mortality,  under-5  mortality,  and life expectancy,  and many  more (see
Table 1 again).  Here, infant mortality,  calorie  intake,  and protein  intake  are significantly  and
positively  related  to income  in both fixed effects  and first differences  - IV regressions.' 4
However,  life expectancy's  relation  to income  is not positive  and significant  under  either
fixed  effects  or first differences  IV (see  Table 2). Other  variables  simply  are insignificant  under
both methods,  such as access  to sanitation.  Access  to clean drinking  water  is also insignificantly
related  to income  under  fixed  effects. Hospital  beds per capita, doctors  per capita,  and nurses  per
capita are positively  and significantly  related  to income  under fixed  effects,  but not under  first
differences - IV.
A monotonically  negative  relationship  of infant  mortality  to income  is strong  in deviations
from time and country  averages.  The magnitude  of the coefficient  in fixed  effects  is in the range
that Filmer  and Pritchett 1997  identified  as common  to most studies.  Pritchett  and Sumrners  1996
present  evidence  that there is a causal relationship  from income  to infant  mortality. The first-
differences  IV results here  confirm  this finding.
5. Transport and communications
One would  expect  transport  and communications  (railroads,  telegrams,  telexes,  telephones,
radios,  TVs, faxes, percent  roads paved)  to go up strongly  with income.  Some  of these
expectations  are ulfilled. Such harbingers  of civilization  as telephones,  telegrams,  and TVs are
significantly  positively  related  to income  under  both fixed  effects  and first differences  IV (Table  2).
Although  these  are private  rather than public  goods,  they are indicators  of the degree  to which  the
government  has invested  in the public  good of communications  infrastructure.
Other  relationships  are more  problematic.  Romer  1990  treated  radios in the cross section
as a variable  so tightly linked  to income  that it could  be used as an instrument  for income  measured14
with error. Radios  are positively  and significantly  related  to income  under  fixed  effects,  but
negatively  and significantly  related  to income  under  first differences.
Another  notable absentee  from  the results is the percent  of roads  that are paved.  In
contrast,  the road length  per car significantly  declines  according  to the fixed  effects  estimator,  as it
did in the levels  regression  (see Table 2).
6. Inequality across class and gender
The relation  of inequality  to income  per capita  has been intensively  studied  with a vast
literature  seeking  to confirm  or reject  the Kuznets  curve.  (For recent  references,  see Deininger  and
Squire 1996 -- the source of my data here -- and Anand and Kanbur 1989). None of the inequality
indicators  here  are significant  under  both fixed  effects  and first differences  IV. The income  share of
the bottom  quintile  is positively  related  to income  under first differences  -IV, but is of the opposite
sign and insignificant  under fixed  effects.  These  non-results  on income  inequality  and income  echo
similar  findings  by Deininger  and Squire 1996.  IS  These  results  could  be seen  as good  news,
because  they contradict  the fears of critics on  the left that income  distribution  would  significantly
worsen  during  growth.
As far as gender  equality  under  fixed  effects,  female  to male primary  enrollment  is
significant  with the "wrong"  sign  with respect  to income.  Female  to male secondary  enrollment  is
significant  with  the "right" sign. None of the gender  equality  measures  are robust  to the use of the
first differences  IV estimator. Figures  4a and 4b show  the absence  of a relationship  between  the
female  to male literacy  ratio and income  in first differences  (4b), in contrast  to the strong
relationship  in levels  (4a).
7. "Bads "
"Bads"  are indicators  that many  consider  a priori  to be unwanted  byproducts  of higher
incomes.  This section  considers  two principle  types of "bads": crime  and the environment,  as well
as some  miscellaneous  ones. The  relationship  between  crime and income  is very weak in the fixed15
effects.  The poor quality  of the data (the  UN Crime  Survey)  and the serious  problem  of variation  in
reporting  do not help this weak relationship.  The only  crime  to be significantly  related  to income  (it
worsens,  in fixed  effects)  is manslaughter  (Table  2).  16  1 could  interpret  these  weak  results as good
news  if my prior was that crime  worsened  with rising income.  None of the crime  indicators  are
significant  under first differences  IV.
The literature  on per capita income  and the other  prominent  "bad"-- pollution  - is already
extensive  (see  Grossman  and Krueger 1993,  Holtz-Eakin  and Selden  1995, and Shafik 1995  for
important  contributions).  Here both  the fixed  effects  and first-differences  estimation  shows  that the
carbon  emissions  indicators  (carbon  dioxide  and industrial  carbon  dioxide)  and waste paper
production  tend  to get worse  with income
The strong link  between  emissions  and income  may in part be an artifact of the way the
source  constructs  emissions  data.' 7 However  derived,  the significant  coefficients  on income  for
emissions  of C02 and industrial  C02 match other  results  in the literature.  Holtz-Eakin  and Selden
1995  found  a significant  coefficient  with an IV fixed  effects  estimator  on C02.'8
Grossman  and Krueger 1993  used  measures  of ambient  air quality  instead  of emissions
data. Unfortunately,  the other  ambient  air quality  measures  and water quality  measures  that
Grossman  and Krueger  used did not have sufficient  time or cross-section  dimension  for use in the
present  study. However,  there is one direct  Grossman-Krueger  measure  of air quality  with
sufficient data -- suspended particulate matter -- but it is not significantly related to income with
the fixed  effects  estimator.  The annual  change  in forest  area is likewise  unrelated  to income.
Finally,  two  very dissimilar  "bads" - suicide  and work  injuries  - are not significantly  related  to
income.  '9
8. Stock-Taking
How can we make sense  of the large mass of material  presented  in Tables 1 and 2? There
is the  good  news  that such core  development  indicators  as child  labor, infant  mortality,  nutritional16
intake,  and communications  infastructure are robustly  related  to income  across  countries  and in
both fixed  effects  or first differences.  The bad news  is that other  key modernization  or development
indicators  like  democracy,  good  institutions,  human  rights,  years of schooling,  school  enrollment
ratios,  and life  expectancy  do not robustly  improve  with income  controlling  for country  effects  and
sometimes  even  have  the wrong  sign.  Additional  bad news  is the robust  association  of "bads" like
C02 emissions  and waste paper production  with growth.
One  primitive  means  of summarizing  the results is simply  to count  the number  of
indicators  where  growth  significantly  betters  welfare  out of the total set of diverse  indicators. This
is imperfect,  since  I can hardly  assert  that the indicators  are independent  Bernoulli  trials of some
abstract quality  of life concept.  Still  no alternative  summary  device  is available.  I will  use this one
while  reminding  the readers  it is preferable  that they  examine  all of the information  in tables 1 and
2.
For  the fixed  effects  estimator  applied  to 81 indicators,  the coefficient  of income  was
significant  at the 5% level for 34 indicators.  Of these  34, 20 of them show  improvement  in the
quality  of life associated  with rising  income.  Fourteen  indicators  show  significant  deterioration  in
quality  of life as income  rises. If we  take the shortcut  of regarding  these as independent  trials of
quality  of life,  we cannot reject  the hypothesis  that quality  of life is equally  likely  to improve  or
worsen  with rising  income  (20 of 34 is not significantly  greater  than 500%).
The fixed  effects  estimator  is appropriate  if we simply  want to chart  the  joint evolution  of
income  and "life," or to discuss  causal determination  of "life" if income  is exogenous.  If income  is
endogenous  and we want to address  causality,  the first-differences  IV estimator  should  be used. Of
the 69 indicators  to which  I applied  this method 20, income  significantly  affected  14 of them.  Six
indicators  of the quality of life significantly  worsened  with rising income  -- corruption,  primary
enrollment,  radios,  total CO 2 emissions,  industrial  CO 2 emissions,  and waste paper  production.
Eight out of the 69 indicators  - government  not breaking  contracts,  child  labor, calorie  intake,17
protein  intake,  infant  mortality,  telephones,  telegrams,  and the share of the bottom  income  quintile  -
- significantly  improved  with rising income.  Again,  we find that quality  of life is about  equally
likely  to improve  or worsen  with rising income.
Although  many of the associations  between  income  and "life" in the SUR levels  sample  are
not robust  to the use of fixed  effects  or first difference  IV methods,  I do not believe  this warrants
discarding  the SUR results. The SUR results in levels  may  still be capturing  a long  run
relationship  between  income  (which  is after all the sum of all past growth)  and "life" (which  is the
sum of all past social  improvements).  The weaker  fixed  effects  and first differences  1V  results  may
be reflecting  the lack of a shorter-run  contemporaneous  relationship  between  income  and measured
indicators  of the quality  of life.
9. Exogenous Changes in Quality of Life Indicators
I noted  in section  II that the estimnation  of separate  time intercepts  allows  me  to calculate
the "exogenous"  change  in each  indicator. "Exogenous  change"  is the change  in the indicator  over
time holding  income  constant.  (I put "exogenous"  in quotes  because  these  time shifts may represent
endogenous  global  innovation  and may be a function  of the global  growth  rate.) Likewise,  I can
calculate  the movement  along  the estimated  indicator-income  curve  and derive  the "growth"
contribution  to the change  over time in the indicator. I annualize  in percent  both the "exogenous
change"  and the "growth  effect."  This allows  me to assess  the relative  importance  of growth  and
exogenous  change  in movements  in the indicator. I do this for the fixed  effects  estimator.
Table 3 shows  the results  for all 81 indicators  for the fixed effects  estimator.  Note first
that the time shifts  are very important  for some  variables  (* indicates  significant  at 5%), even
though  we might  have  worried  that such shifts  would  be imprecisely  estimated  with  tirne periods  as
short  as a decade.  Moreover,  most of the  time shifts  (51 out of 81 indicators)  improve  quality of
life.18
How does  the exogenous  time shift effect  compare  to the growth  effect  for each indicator?
I will  use the same  kind of crude  indicator  count  as before.  With the Fixed  Effects  estimator,  67
percent  of the indicators  had time  shifts improve  the indicator  more  than did the growth  effects. 21
I did this exercise  also for the First Differences  IV estimator.  In the sample  of 69
indicators  available  for the First Differences  indicator,  62 percent  of the indicators  had time shifts
improve  the indicator  more  than  growth  did (not shown  but available  upon request).  For example,
even  a variable  as strongly  related  to income  as infant mortality  declined  more  from exogenous
change  over time (-1.6%  per year)  than  from rising income  (-0.9%  per year).
I combine  this result  with  the previous  results on significance  of income.  I noted  before
that 20 out of 81 quality  of life  indicators  had a significantly  positive  relationship  with income
under  fixed  effects.  Time improved  10 of these  20 indicators  more  than income  did. The 10 that
had growth  dominate  with a significant  positive  sign  are: a government  that does  not break
contracts,  child  labor, coups, revolutions,  war deaths  per capita, calorie  intake,  protein  intake,
hospital  beds,  telephones,  and mail. Under  the first differences  estimator,  6 out of 69 indicators  had
a positive,  significant  relationship  with income  that was more  important  than exogenous  change:
government  does  not break contracts,  calorie  intake,  protein  intake,  telephones,  telegrams,  and the
share of the bottom  income  quintile.  Of these  six, telegrams  and the share of the bottom  income
quintile  were not in the fixed  effects  list but the other four were.  With the SUR estimator,  the
indicator  "government  does  not break  contracts"  has an exogenous  trend  stronger  than the growth
effect.  So  there are three variables  robust  to all three estimators  for which  growth  is the primnary
life-improving  and significant  determinant:  calorie  intake,  protein  intake,  and telephones.
V. Robustness  Checks
In this section,  I perform  a number  of robustness  checks.  I check  first-stage  regressions,
apply some  non-parametric  tests, check  for nonlinearities,  and consider  the special  case of the fast-
growing  East Asian economies.19
One  might  worry  that the IV coefficient  estimates  on income  will be very imprecise  if the
first stage  regression  was a poor fit. I have  first-stage  R-squareds  of .32, .23, .23, .10, and .10 for
the first stage regressions  in the different  time periods  60,70,80,90;  80,90; 70,80,90;  70, 80; and
60,70,80.  The F-statistic is insignificant  only in the last two regressions  (actually  the same
regression  given  the use of income  lagged  two periods)  for 70,80 and 60,70,80.  There  are 12
indicators  run in first differences  -IV  that belong  to these problematic  time periods;  only one of
them  is significant.  The estimates  for the other  time  periods  seem  to be on firmer  ground.
Next, I expand  the length  of period  from 10 years to 30 years. Perhaps  the decade  data are
so noisy  as to obscure  the temporal  association  of life with growth.  How did growth  of income  over
thirty years causally  affect the growth  of quality  of life indicators?  I run IV on the 25 indicators
that have  the requisite  data, using  the policy  indicators  as instruments  (first stage  R2=.29). 22 The
results (not  shown)  have a familiar  ring:  4 of the 25 indicators  are significant  with the "right" sign
and 4 with  the "wrong"  sign. The  identity  of the "good"  significant  indicators  is also familiar:
child  labor,  infant  mortality,  phones,  and TVs.
As another  robustness  check,  I use a non-parametric  test of whether  a country  that moved
up (down)  in the ranks of income  also moved  up (down)  in the ranks of the social indicator  from
1960  to 1990.  I do a simple  signs  test for whether  the sign of the change  in the ranking  of the social
indicator  matched  that of the change  in income  ranking. Six of the 25 variables  showed  a positive
association  between  the change  in rank in income  from 1960  to 1990  and the change  in rank of the
quality  of life indicator.  Four showed  a negative  association.  Such standard  development  indicators
as female  literacy,  life expectancy,  primary  and secondary  enrollment,  and the share of population
with no schooling  failed to show improvement  with rising  income  according  to this method.
1. Nonlinearities
Next, I check  directly  whether  there were  pronounced  nonlinearities  that might  have caused
the specifications  (1) and (2) to be seriously  misspecified.  The quality of life literature  sometimes20
postulates  a U-shaped  or inverted  U-shaped  function  of y for L. Could  it be that a zero  average
relationship  obscures  a path in which  quality  of life falls (rises)  and then  rises (falls)  with rising
income?
I split the sample  for the first-differences  IV regression  into  the portions  above  and below
the whole  sample  mean  across countries.  If there were a pronounced  U-shape,  the coefficient  on
income  growth  in this regression  should  change  sign from low  to high income.  I perform  this
exercise  using  both the log-change  and linear-change  specifications  for the dependent  variable.
As it turns out, there are only  two variables  that have  significant  coefficients  of opposite
sign  between  low and high income.  The linear  change  in doctors  per capita is negatively  and
significantly  related  to income  growth  at below-average  incomes  and positively  and significantly
related  to growth  at above-average  incomes.  The change  in primary  school  enrollment  is positively
associated  with growth at below  average  incomes  and negatively  associated  at above  average
incomes.
I perform  a similar  exercise  for the fixed  effects  estimator  by adding  a quadratic  term in
the log of initial  income  to the FE regression. The quadratic  term will  eventually  become  dominant
so its sign  and significance  indicate  what will  eventually  happen  to the dependent  variable  as
income  rises (the turning  points with significant  quadratic  terms  were generally  well within  the
sample  range).  There were seven  indicators  that did not significantly  improve  with growth  under
the linear  specification  that do show  significant  eventual  improvement  under  the quadratic
specification  (a right-side-up  U). However,  what the quadratic  giveth,  the quadratic  also taketh
away. There  were seven  indicators  that did show improvement  under the linear specification  that
show  a significant  eventual  deterioration  under  the quadratic  specification  (an upside down  U).
There is little  evidence  that the existence  of U-curves  is responsible  for the low  number  of quality
of life  indicators  that are positively  and significantly  related  to income  under fixed  effects.21
Note  that the quadratic  function  of income  could  also capture  a monotonic  relationship  that
is concave  or convex. This would  show  up if the turning  point in income  were close  to the
endpoints  of the income  range. Infant  mortality,  child  labor, and mail per capita  show a
relationship  in which  there is not much  improvement  at low income  but there is much  more  at
higher  incomes. Carbon dioxide  emissions,  sulfur  dioxide  emissions,  war deaths,  and the ratio of
females  to males  for higher  education  show  a relationship  to income  in which  there is a strong
change  at lower  levels  of income  that tails off at high incomes. (All  these  results are of the same
sign as in the original  fixed effects  results).  The  limited  number  of variables  in which  concave  or
convex  relationships  hold, and with most of these  having  the same sign  and significance  as in the
fixed  effects  results, suggest  that convexity  or concavity  of the income-social  indicator  does not
change  the basic story.
I next consider  whether  the existence  of some  bounded  variables  may have  contributed  to
the poor results  with the linear  or log-linear  results. I do two monotonic  transformations  in fixed
effects  of those L variables  bounded  between  zero  and one. First, I use the inverse  logistic  function
L/(1  -L), which  maps the [0,1]  variable  into [O,oo].  This transformation  imnplies  that y will  have a
strong  effect on L at low incomes,  but progressively  smaller  effects  at higher  incomes.  Second,  I
use the negative  reciprocal  function,  -IL,  which  maps the [0,1] variable  into [,-1].  The negative
reciprocal  transformation  implies  that L will hardly  improve  at low incomes  but will improve  much
at high incomes.  I apply  these  transfornations  to all the variables  that are bounded  between  zero
and one and actually  range  between  zero  and one in the sample. These  variables  are % literate, %
no schooling  in population,  enrollment  ratios  for primary  and secondary  education,  % with access
to clean  drinking  water (total, rural, and urban), and % with access  to sanitation  (total, rural, and
urban). Of these,  the only  one where  income  becomes  positive  and significant  in either  of the two22
functional  forms is % rural with access  to clean drinking  water (negative  reciprocal  functional
forrn).
I apply  a related  functional  transfornation to the first differences  IV regression.  I estimate
the improvement  in the L variable  as a ratio to the maximum  possible  improvement:
(L-L(-l))/(1-L(-l)).23  The  only variable  to become  significant  in differences  in this functional  form
is the enrollment  ratio for secondary  education.
Another  type of nonlinearity  might  be irreversibility  of social  indicators. Some  indicators
may improve  with growth,  but not symmetrically  worsen  with  negative  growth  (for example,  roads
paved  and railroad  mileage). I checked  this by introducing  intercept  and slope  dummies  for
observations  in which  decade  growth  was negative. 24 The only indicators  that support  the
irreversibility  argument  (having  a significantly  lower  coefficient  when  growth  is negative)  are the
ratio of females  to males  in higher  education,  hospital  beds, and literacy.  However,  the coefficient
on the positive  change  in income  is not significantly  different  from  zero  for these  three indicators.  I
conclude  that irreversibility  is not a major factor in the evolution  of social  indicators.
2.  Changes in Quality of Life Indicators in Fast Growing Economies
It may  be that we fail  to detect  consistent  changes  in the quality  of life with income
because  income  has not grown  very much  in many  economies.  Another  robustness  check  I can
perform  is to look at the subset  of rapidly  growing  economies.  I choose  the countries  covered  in
the World Bank's East Asian Miracle - Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore,  Taiwan,  and Thailand  (other  high growth  economies  like  Botswana  and Lesotho  have
poor data availability). To summarize  a large amount  of information,  I use the device  of
examining  the change  in percentile  rank of each country  for each indicator  from 1960  to 1990.
This automatically  controls  for the global shift in level  of each indicator  from 1960  to 1990.  As
shown  in Table 4, each of the East  Asian mniracles  moved  up by around  a quartile  in the income23
ranking  from 1960  to 1990. Did they  have  some similarly  large  upward  movements  in the rankings
of the quality  of life indicators?
Table 4 shows  the results  for individual  indicators  and countries.  There are some  notable
successes:  the reduction  in the unschooled  population  in Japan (shown  with sign  reversed),  the
increase  in life expectancy  and reduction  in infant  mortality  in Japan, the rise in hospital  beds in
Korea  and Thailand,  the increase  in TVs in Indonesia  and Malaysia,  the increase  in radios in
Indonesia  and Korea,  the change  in telephones  in Korea,  and the increase  in female  to male average
schooling  years in Indonesia.  However,  another  thing  to note is the number  of negadve signs  (here
as elsewhere  I change  the sign  of each  indicator  so that increase  means  improved  quality of life).
Out of 141  entries,  70 are negative  - indicating  that the East Asian  miracles  have  moved  down  in
the rankings  on quality  of life  indicators  about  as often  as they  have  moved  up. This seems  to
reinforce  the finding  from the first difference  regressions  that there is not a strong  tendency  for
positive  changes  in quality of life  to be associated  with positive  changes  in income.
Examining  individual  countries,  we see that Korea is the  only one with a median  strong
upward  movement  in quality  of life rankings. Examining  individual  indicators,  we see that goods
that have  a strong  private good  element  -telephones,  TVs, and radios  - do show a strong  upward
movement  with East Asian growth. There  are a couple  other indicators  that show strong
improvement  - nurses and ratio of female  to male  enrollment  for secondary  education.  However,
the median  change  in percentile  ranking  in the quality  of life  indicators  is just 3 percentage  points.
Figure 5 gives the example  of the higher  education  indicators  - both total enrollment  and
equality  between  men  and women.  With  total higher  education  enrollment,  three of the tigers  -
Japan, Taiwan,  and Thailand  - had faster increases  than the world  median,  but four other  tigers
had slower  increases  than  the world  median  despite  their faster  GDP growth. On  the ratio of
women  to men in higher  education,  which  was significantly  related  to income  in the SUR levels
regressions,  all of the tigers except  Singapore  have  a slower  increase  than the world  median.24
(Singapore  almost  exactly  follows  the world  median,  which  was why  it is hard to distinguish  in the
graph.)
V. Conclusions
How can the cross-time  growth  effects  be so weak  when  the cross-section,  cross-time
income  effects  are so strong?  I believe  both findings  should  be taken seriously,  so we need  a story
of how  there could  be a strong  cross-country  relationship  but a weak  cross-time  relationship.
Note first of all that worsening  income  distribution,  as hypothesized  by many  critics of
growth,  is not the operative  mechanism.  There is no evidence  here  that income  distribution  worsens
during  growth;  actually,  there is some evidence  that the share of the poor in national  income  gets
better with growth.  So what accounts  for the strong  cross-section  cross-time  findings  but weak
cross-time  results?
The most prosaic  possibility  is that the methods  of fixed  effects  and first differences
simply  remove  too much  of the signal  and leave  too much  of the noise. The noise  may  come  from
measurement  error or just from temporary  shocks  to income  or the quality  of life indicator.
Detecting  the signal  is less likely  once  one removes  the large  cross-section  differences  in income.
Even  if measurement  error is the problem,  these  results  are important  to show  us the limitations  of
our knowledge  on the contemporaneous  link  between  growth  and changed  quality  of life.  There is
a related  and plausible  possibility.  Perhaps long  and variable  lags and the lack of sufficiently  long
time series  prevent  the detection  in decade  changes  of the true relationship  between  life and growth.
Recall  from the economic  history  literature  on the now-rich  nations  the documentation  of episodes
of declining  quality  of life  indicators  while  per capita income  was rising. This historical  evidence
may reflect  the long lags between  income  growth  and quality  of life improvements.  Similarly  for
our sample,  past growth  and social  investment  over many  decades  may have  been one of the "fixed
factors"  that was differenced  out in the fixed  effects  and first differences  methods. The cross-25
section  may contain  the true long-run  relationship  after all, while  the fixed  effects  and first
differences  methods  just showed  the weak  contemporaneous  part of a long lag structure.
A more  fundamental  change  from conventional  wisdom  would  be that fixed  factors really
could  be the dominant  determinant  of a country's income  and quality  of life indicators. As already
noted,  such  fixed  factors could  include:  a country's  resource  endowments,  access  to the sea, ethnic
fragmentation,  social  infrastructure,  climate,  and legal  systems.  These  factors  would  create  a
spurious  correlation  in the cross  section,  which  would  be correctly  removed  in the fixed  effects  and
first differences  methods.
Another  possibility  is that, since  the main criterion  for selecting  these indicators  was that
they  were at least partially  public  goods,  there is a public  goods  problem  during  growth.  A rise in
private  incomes  (per capita  GDP) does  not necessarily  translate  into  increased  public  goods.  John
Kenneth  Galbraith  made a famous  argument  to this effect  for the 1950s  US in his  Affluent Society.
Finally,  there is the credible  possibility  that changes  in the home  country's quality  of life
indicators  depend  as much on changes  in world income  as on changes  in home country  growth.
For example,  the improvement  in life expectancy  everywhere  may  have reflected  technical
breakthroughs  in antibiotics  associated  with world economic  growth.  The strong results on the
exogenous  time shifts, even  in the SUR levels  regressions,  point in this direction.
In conclusion,  the evidence  that life gets better  during  growth  is surprisingly  uneven,  while
the cross-country  relationship  between  income  and diverse  indicators  of the quality  of life remains
strong.26
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Endnotes
I  p. 453,  Barro and Sala-i-Martin  1995
2, Huntington  was  characterizing  the viewpoint  of the 60s from  the vantage  point of the 80s.
3Wallerstein  1976.
4ne  most well-known  critic  of GDP  growth is the Human Development  Report of the United  Nations  Development
Program,  the 1996  issue  of which opened  with:  "The purpose  of growth  should  be to enrich  people's lives. But far too
often.  it does not." The Brandt Commission  of 1980  warned against  the "persistent  confusion  of growth  with
development."  The 1994  Independent  Commission  on Population  and the Quality  of Life  concluded  that "GNP  proves
to be an inadequate  road-map  for the quality of life," a conclusion  the authors  thought  was so important  that they
repeated  the sentence  four  separate times.  The usual concern  underlying  these sentiments  is that income  distribution
worsens  during  growth,  so that the majority  of the population  experience  no benefits.
5 Exceptions  are Kakwani 1993,  Sen 1994,  Dasgupta  and Weale 1992  and Pritchett  and Summers  1995,  but they all
concentrate  on one or a handful  of indicators. Conversely,  there is a literature  on quality  of life over  time based  on a
small  number  of rich countries  (e.g. Baumol  et al. 1989,  Fogel 1994). Finally there is Fedderke  and Klitgaard 1998,
who do have a diverse  set of indicators  but have  no time dimension.
6 This  project  gathered  data first from several  large  cross-national  databases  available:  the World  Bank's BESD  data
collection,  Political  Risk Services  data, Banks 1994,  Deininger  and Squire 1996,  Taylor  and Jodice  1983,  Barro  and
Lee 1996,  various  United  Nations publications,  and the World  Resources  Institute 1994.  (See Appendix  1 for  a full
list of sources.)  Secondly,  I used data from more  specialized  sources  discovered  in a literature  search  over  the
categories  mentioned.  Where  multiple versions  were available  of the samne  indicator  were available,  I chose  the one
with the largest  number  of observations  - other  things equal - and I preferred  original  sources  over  secondary
sources.  When  I had two slightly  different  measures  of the same  general phenomenon,  I keep the one  Ijudge to be
closer  to "quality  of life" and discard  the other.
7'  have an unbalanced  panel because  of uneven  data availability  by dates. I estimate  (1) with the Least-Squares
Durmmy  Variable  method  discussed  by Greene  1997 and Baltagi  1995,  i.e. simply  running  OLS  on yit  with dummy
variables  for the X,  and p'i
8 Tre direct  source for the first two is Easterly  and Levine 1997.  The source for inflation is Bruno and Easterly 1998.
9Fedderke and Klitgaaard 1998  also found  rights, institutional  efficiency,  political  stability,  and absence  of
separatism  to improve  with per capita  income.
1  The positive correlation between crime and income, or between suicide and income may reflect greater
reporting in high-income societies.
It The  only  difference  between this moving  average  over  income  and the k-nearest  neighbor  estimator  is that the
former  averages  over  the k nearest in rank, while the latter  averages  over the k nearest in distance.
12 I calculated  this by ordering  the sample  by the dependent  variable  and showing  the mean  dependent  variable value
for the top 30 and the bottom 30.
13 Other  social scientists,  such as O'Kane 1983  and Londregan  and Poole 1990,  have noted  the negative  cross-
nat'ional  relationship  between income  per capita and coups,  albeit without  controlling  for country  fixed  effects.
14 J1licroeconomic  studies  have shown  the connection  between  income  and nutrition (Ravallion  1992,1990).  Wolfe
and Behrman  1983  show  that it weakens  if they introduce  other  controls  such as mother's knowledge  of nutrition
(correlated  with income  - here's the partial-total  problem once  again).
15  [ do not  have enough  data to estimate  a relationship  between absolute  poverty  and income.  Ravallioni  and Chen
1997  find a relationship  between the increase  in mean  consumption  and the reduction  in poverty  in a survey  panel
data set.
16 tNote  that most of the data here are from  the upper  national  income  quintiles,  so we cannot  say what is happening  at
the bottom 1,  2 or even 3 quintiles.  The previous  literature  also showed  an ambiguous  relationship  between  crime
and income,  although  again focusing  on partial  correlations  and the cross-section.  Rahav  and Jaamdar 1982  for
example  found  a positive  partial correlation  of theft with income  and a negative  relation  of homicide  to income. But
they were controlling  for factors  strongly  correlated  with income  such as urbanization,  mass  communication,
transportation,  and education.  Bennett 1991  looks  at INTERPOL  cross-country  crime statistics.  He finds evidence  for
income  per capita  raising theft rates but not affecting  homicide. His equation includes  a number  of other  control
variables.  Unnithan  and Whitt 1992  find no relationship  between  hornicide  and per capita  income  in a cross-national
study. Fajnzylber,  Lederman,  and Loayza  1998  find no robust  link between  homicidetrobbery  and per capita income,
either using  cross-section  or dynamic  panel  methods.
17  According  to the United  Nations  Environment  Program 1994,  staff estimated  carbon  dioxide  emissions  based  on
UN consumption  data  for gases,  liquids and solid fuels plus cement  manufacturing  - not bad proxies  for GDP. They31
then apply  "appropriate  emission  factors  (P. 34)." Oak  Ridge  National  Laboratory  1989  (the source  of the UN
methodology)  confirms  that these  "appropriate  emission  factors"  are applied as constants  for each  type of fuel  (and
for cement  manufacturing)  across countries  and across  time.
1' These authors  find evidence  of quadratic  turning  points, but they are at very  high income levels. Shafik 1994  finds
an extremely  strong  relationship  between  income  and C02 emissions  without  correcting  for country  effects.
'9  Unnithan  and Whitt 1992  find that suicide  is not significantly  correlated  with income  across  nations. Hamermesh
and Soss 1974  used micro data and found the sign  of the income-suicide  relation  to be generally  negative.
20 The other  indicators  did  not have  data for 80 or later, which  is required  for this method  using  income  lagged  two
periods,  or were missing  data on the instruments  making  the sample  too small.
21 Preston 1976  found that 16  percent of the rise in life expectancy  from  the 1930s  to the 1960s  was due to per capita
income  growth,  while 84 percent was due to exogenous  time  shifts.
22The  25 indicators  are child labor,  strikes, government  crises,  purges, riots, war deaths  per capita, average  years of
schooling,  percent with  no schooling,  higher education  enrollment,  secondary  enrollment,  primary  enrollment,  life
expectancy,  infant mortality,  hospital  beds, doctors  per capita,  telephones  per capita, radios per capita, TVs per
capita, the Gini coefficient,  ratio of average  years of schooling  for females  to that for males,  female  literacy,  ratio of
female  to male primary  enrollment,  ratio of female to male secondary  enrollment,  ratio of female  to male higher
educational  enrollment,  and carbon  dioxide  emissions.
23  An anonymous  referee suggested  this functional  form.
24 I did the regressions  with the intercept  and slope  dummy  in OLS, given  the difficulty  of instrumenting  for  intercept
and slope dummies.  An anonymous  referee  suggested  the irreversibility  argument.Poticy Research  Working Paper Series
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